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Richard A. Posnert
When I started teaching at the University of Chicago Law School
in 1969, the dominant figures on the faculty (besides Dean Phil C.
Neal) were Philip Kurland and, even more so, Bernard Meltzer. They
set the tone for the law school. The tone was that of the Harvard Law
School as I remembered it from my time there as a student, a decade
earlier (1959-1962). I did not much like that tone at either time, but
that was my youthful rebelliousness.
After a quarter century as a judge, I have come to appreciate the
great strengths that Meltzer brought to legal teaching and scholarship,
and to lament the passing of the model of the academic lawyer that he
exemplified.
What has happened since the 1960s-that watershed decade in
modern American history-is the growing apart, especially but not
only at the elite law schools, of the lawyer and the judge on the one
hand and the law professor on the other hand. Law professors used to
identify primarily with the legal profession and secondarily with the
university. The sequence has been reversed. Law professors in that
earlier era were hired after a few years of practice, on the basis of evi-
dence (heavily weighted by performance as a law student) of possess-
ing superlative skills of legal analysis. A law professor was expected to
be a superb lawyer and to see his primary role as instructing genera-
tions of law students so that they would become good, and some of
them superb, lawyers- instructing them by precept but also by exam-
ple, by being a role model; and the role was that of a practicing lawyer.
The scholarship that law professors did tended to be either pedagogi-
cal, as in the editing of casebooks, or to be of service to the practicing
bar and the judiciary, as in the writing of legal treatises, articles on
points of law, and contributions to legal reform, exemplified by the
American Law Institute's restatements of the law.
By the late 1960s this model was almost a century old and ripe for
challenge. The challenges came from two directions, which though
opposed to each other turned out to be complementary in their effect
on the traditional model. One, the direction from social science, and in
particular from economics, complained because the conventional
model did not enable its practitioners to articulate concrete social
goals for law and to test legal doctrines against those goals. Conven-
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law,
The University of Chicago Law School.
435
The University of Chicago Law Review
tional analysis could not tell judges and legislators when, for example,
the rule of tort liability should be negligence and when strict liability;
or how to decide when a land use should be deemed a nuisance, when
a preliminary injunction should be granted and when denied, when
solicitations by police to commit a crime should be deemed entrapment,
whether a rescuer of a lost item should have a legal claim to the reward
posted by the owner though unaware of the offer of the reward, or
whether spendthrift trusts should be allowed because they reduce, or
forbidden because they increase, the likelihood of bankruptcy.
The second challenge, the challenge inspired by the left-wing
politics that helped to define the late 1960s and early 1970s, com-
plained that the conventional approach was a mask for decisions
reached on base political grounds. The "crits" resurrected the legal
realism of the 1920s and 1930s in a more strident form and rejected
the legal-process school of the 1950s that had sought to reconcile legal
realism with traditional theories of law.
These challenges to the conventional model of the law professor's
vocation so far succeeded as to bring about a fundamental change in
the character of legal teaching and scholarship and the method of re-
cruitment into academic law. From the challenge mounted by social
science came a novel emphasis on basing legal scholarship on the in-
sights of other fields, such as economics, philosophy, and history, and
from the challenge mounted by the Left came a reinforcing skepticism
about the capacity of conventional legal analysis to yield intellectually
cogent answers to legal questions. These ideologically opposed chal-
lenges complemented each other by agreeing that the traditional
model was narrow and stale.
The model was largely buried in these twin avalanches, especially
in the elite law schools. The older generation, the generation commit-
ted to the conventional model, responded in part with bitterness and
in part with silence. Not all, of course, and signally not Bernie Meltzer,
who carried on imperturbably and into extreme old age in the style of
the famous "old school" professors, such as James Casner, Barton
Leach, and Robert Braucher at Harvard, and of Harvard judges such
as Felix Frankfurter and Learned Hand (Hand of the Bill of Right
lectures, in particular). Meltzer was in fact a favorite of Frankfurter,
who taught Meltzer at Harvard (where Meltzer took an LL.M., after
graduating first in his class from the University of Chicago Law
School.) Meltzer's skillful cross-examinations at Nuremberg marked
him as a master of practical lawyering, and he continued to demon-
strate that mastery throughout his academic career.
In exemplifying the traditional model of the engaged, the worldly,
teacher-scholar, Meltzer reminded us of its strengths. Even at the most
intellectually ambitious of the modem law schools, a large majority of
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students will become and remain practicing lawyers; and there is a
good deal more to the practice of law than economics, or philosophy,
or feminism, or theories of race. There is the knack of reading cases
and statutes creatively, there is a largish body of basic legal concepts
that every practicing lawyer should internalize, there is a bag of rhe-
torical tricks to be acquired along with a professional demeanor, a
procedural system to be mastered, a subtle sense ("judgment") of just
how far one can go in stretching the limits of established legal doc-
trines to be absorbed. These things cannot be the entirety of the mod-
ern lawyer's professional equipment, and their inculcation cannot be
the entirety of a first-rate modern legal education, because the law has
become too deeply interfused with the methods and insights of other
fields-and the law schools are still lagging badly in attempting to
overcome the shameful aversion of most law students to statistics,
math, science, and technology. Maybe at the law schools that have the
brightest students only a third of the instruction should be in the tradi-
tional mold. But to reach that level the law schools will have to start
hiring teachers who identify more strongly with the practicing profes-
sion than they do with academia.
The loss is not only in the kind of teaching that Meltzer exempli-
fied, but also in his style of scholarship. In a system of case law, which
is the dominant American system of law even in primarily statutory
fields such as labor, which was Meltzer's principal field of teaching
and scholarship, the principles and rules of law are not found in au-
thoritative texts - in legal codes - but instead have to be inferred from
statutory and constitutional texts, yes, but even more from judicial
opinions, whether they are common law opinions or statutory or con-
stitutional glosses. Inferred law is "unwritten" in the significant sense
that it is constructed by the judges and lawyers from scattered, some-
times inconsistent, and often ambiguous, incomplete, or poorly in-
formed materials, mainly, as I said, judicial opinions. The messy work
product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of tidying
up, of synthesis, analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellec-
tually demanding tasks, requiring vast knowledge and the ability (not
only brains and knowledge and judgment, but also Sitzfleisch) to or-
ganize dispersed, fragmentary, prolix, and rebarbative materials. These
are tasks that lack the theoretical breadth or ambition of scholarship
in more typically academic fields. Yet they are of inestimable impor-
tance to the legal system and of greater social value than much eso-
teric interdisciplinary legal scholarship.
Because of the enormous financial rewards that today await the
successful practitioner, and the alienation of the academic legal pro-
fession from the practice of law, superlawyers of the caliber of Bernie
Meltzer will no longer dominate law school faculties. He was almost
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the last survivor of an era. With his example before us, we can reflect
on what has been lost and consider how some of it might be regained.
